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Abstract
In this study, I examine whether companies realize operational benefits from making “targeted
auditor switches” (i.e., engaging a new auditor recently dismissed by a competitor company).
While prior work provides evidence consistent with companies perceiving that auditor information
spillovers are costly, there is sparse extant evidence as to whether auditors actually do transfer
operational information across companies. I find that companies that switch to a competitor’s
former auditor realize significant subsequent improvements in operating performance, and I
provide evidence that the association between targeted auditor switches and improvements in
operating performance varies predictably with several across- and within-market factors. In
addition, I find that the operational improvements associated with targeted switches are driven by
reductions in operating expenditures as opposed to increases in revenues. Collectively, my findings
suggest that operational information can be transferred across companies via external auditors and
that companies’ concerns over sharing an auditor with a competitor are based on real information
spillover costs.
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1. Introduction
In this study, I examine whether companies realize operational benefits from engaging a
new auditor recently dismissed by a competitor company. Given the broad scope of a public
company audit and the nature of the auditing process, external auditors become privy to an array
of proprietary client information.1 Under Rule 301 of the AICPA’s Code of Professional Conduct,
auditors are explicitly restricted from disclosing any confidential client information without the
consent of the client (AICPA 2013).2 However, despite auditors’ codified obligation to protect
sensitive client information, there is considerable extant evidence suggesting that companies are
reluctant to share an auditor with a competitor company over concerns of proprietary information
spillovers (e.g., Tierney 1989; Berton and Niebuhr 1990; Aobdia 2015; Bills, Cobabe, Pittman,
and Stein 2020; Kang, Lennox, and Pandey 2020).
The potential benefits (and costs) of auditor information spillovers are considerable given
that the information accumulated by an auditor is not necessarily limited to a client’s financial
reporting function.3 Consistent with this, KPMG’s Global Head of Audit Larry Bradley recently
stated as part of the firm’s “Value of Audit” report that, “we [as auditors] have broader access to
a company than almost any other entity or profession. I’ve been an audit partner my entire career,
and in that role you look across so many different things—IT, HR, legal, compliance, finance,
control, etc.” (KPMG 2014, p. 4). In the same report, KPMG’s US Head of Audit Jim Liddy
remarked that, “we [as auditors] also add value by delivering insight and perspective across a wide

The term “proprietary information” is generally defined as any information that a company protects against
disclosure and that adds commercial value to the company (e.g., Dye 1986). While items such as customer lists, trade
secrets, and formulae are often presented as examples of proprietary information, many other types of information can
be considered proprietary including company policies and procedures, operational processes, technical know-how,
and business strategies. For purposes of this study, I consider proprietary information to include any company
information that, if disclosed, would be potentially beneficial to the operations of the company’s competitors.
2
The full text of Rule 301 is presented in Appendix A.
3
Auditor information spillovers represent a potential cost to the company whose information is being transferred and
a potential benefit to the company (or companies) to which the information is being transferred.
1

1

array of financial, regulatory, operational and technology topics” (KPMG 2014, p. 10). Consistent
with these practitioners’ views, auditors have ample opportunities to gain insights into client
operations through activities such as internal control audit procedures (e.g., walk-throughs,
interviews, observations), risk assessment procedures (e.g., obtaining an understanding of the
client’s competitive environment and technological developments), and certain agreed-upon
procedures (PCAOB 2007, 2010; Cai, Kim, Park, and White 2016).4 Auditors also often
accumulate information related to clients’ operations through informal discussions with
management and other company personnel (Cai et al. 2016) and provide operational suggestions
to clients via these same types of discussions as well as through other channels such as
management letters (Eilifsen, Knechel, and Wallage 2001).
A potential reason why companies are reluctant to share an auditor with a competitor is
that the opportunity for the transfer of proprietary information via the auditor exists even in the
absence of explicit leakages. Auditors’ use of “best practices” represents one likely mechanism for
the indirect transfer of proprietary knowledge across clients. Best practices represent an
“institutionalized channel for information spillovers in auditing” (Aobdia 2015, p. 1509) and often
include benchmarks that are formulated by the auditor and communicated across clients. While
information spillovers through best practices are by nature indirect, auditors can transfer client
information either intentionally or unintentionally using this mechanism (Cashell and Fuerman
1995; Cahan, Godfrey, Hamilton, and Jeter 2008). In addition, unlike the explicit disclosure of
confidential client information, auditors are not restricted from employing the use of best practices
and, in some cases, are actually encouraged to do so (McAllister and Cripe 2008; AICPA 2013;

4

As stated in PCAOB Auditing Standard (AS) 2101 on Audit Planning, when developing the audit strategy and audit
plan, auditors are required to consider “matters relating to the company’s business, including its organization,
operating characteristics, and capital structure” (emphasis added) (PCAOB 2010).
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PCAOB 2018).
Recent work finds that companies are reluctant to share an auditor (or a specific audit
partner) with a rival company due to information spillover concerns and that this reluctance is
more prominent when the costs of information leakage are higher (Aobdia 2015; Bills et al. 2020;
Kang et al. 2020). While these papers provide evidence consistent with companies perceiving that
auditor information spillovers are costly (and conversely beneficial for companies on the receiving
end of the spillovers), little extant evidence exists as to whether there are operational consequences
of auditor information transfer.5 I fill this void in the literature by examining “targeted auditor
switches” (i.e., auditor switches where the company making the switch subsequently selects an
auditor that was dismissed by (or resigned from) one of the company’s local market competitors
in the immediately preceding period). In doing so, I attempt to determine whether there are
operational benefits associated with engaging a competitor’s former auditor and, consequently,
whether concerns over auditor sharing are based on real information spillover costs or merely the
perception of spillover costs.
I begin by investigating whether companies that make targeted auditor switches realize
improvements in operating performance following these switches. This analysis is motivated by
extant evidence suggesting that, given auditors’ unique exposure to client information and the
comprehensive nature of the auditing process, there are ample opportunities for information to be
transferred across companies via the auditor (Cahan et al. 2008; Werner 2009; Rapoport 2013).
Notably, this form of information spillover can be beneficial to the recipient company even absent
intentional leakage (e.g., through auditor best practices) (McAllister and Cripe 2008; McDonald

5

There is extant evidence suggesting that auditor knowledge spillovers (through the joint provision of audit and nonaudit services) lead to improvements in audit and financial reporting quality (e.g., Lim and Tan 2008; Christensen,
Olson, and Omer 2015).
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2013). I focus on company operating performance as the primary outcome of interest because, as
discussed above, auditors have broad access to client operations and often provide suggestions to
clients regarding operational issues (Eilifsen et al. 2001; KPMG 2014; Cai et al. 2016). In addition,
evidence from prior work suggests that company managers’ discretionary decisions can be
influenced by the company’s auditor (Aobdia 2015) and that auditors must develop a deep
understanding of clients’ operations and generally know more about a client’s business operations
than any other outside party (SEC 2000).6
Using two measures of operating performance, I test the relation between targeted auditor
switches and subsequent changes in company operating performance. The results of these tests
reveal that companies that make targeted auditor switches realize superior improvements in
operating performance relative to both companies that do not switch auditors and companies that
make non-targeted switches. These improvements are economically significant. Specifically, the
estimated increase in two-year operating income growth (operating cash flow growth) for
companies that make targeted switches is approximately 19.3 percent (16.0 percent) of the
interquartile range of each measure, respectively. These results suggest that targeted auditor
switches on average yield significant operational benefits, presumably (at least in part) through
auditor information spillovers.
To support this interpretation of the primary results, I next perform a series of crosssectional analyses. I consider both across-market (i.e., industry- or geographic-level) factors and
within-market (i.e., company-level) factors that are likely to influence the relation between

In a comment letter to the SEC, Deloitte states that “[a company’s auditor is] often more knowledgeable about a
company's financial systems, internal controls and business operations than anyone else both from the standpoint of
experience with a number of companies in the industry as well as with the audit client in particular. This experience
yields state of the art knowledge about the client, its systems and its needs, that is more efficiently transferred to other
individuals within the same accounting firm, than to third parties with no previous exposure to the companies'
business” (SEC 2000, p. 24).
6
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targeted auditor switches and operating performance improvements. The first factor I consider is
industry concentration. Ali, Klasa, and Yeung (2014) posit that proprietary costs are higher in more
concentrated industries because companies in these industries generally have more restrictive
disclosure policies, and consequently, leakages (whether intentional or unintentional) of a
company’s proprietary information are more valuable to the company’s competitors relative to
leakages in less concentrated industries. Consistent with the primary results being attributable to
spillovers of proprietary information via the auditor, I find that the association between targeted
auditor switches and changes in operating performance is increasing in industry concentration.
The second factor I consider is the strength of non-compete agreement enforcement. An
alternative mechanism for companies to benefit from information spillovers is through hiring
individuals currently (or formerly) employed by a market competitor. However, the strength of the
enforceability of “non-compete agreements” (i.e., contracts between an employee and an employer
in which the employee agrees not to enter into competition with the employer during or after
employment) has been shown to affect the likelihood of this form of information spillover
(Belenzon and Schankerman 2013). Consistent with targeted auditor switches being a more viable
option for companies seeking beneficial information spillover in the presence of stronger noncompete enforcement, I find that the positive association between targeted switches and changes
in operating performance is greater for companies headquartered in states with relatively strong
non-compete enforcement.
The third factor I consider is auditor liability exposure. Prior work documents that auditors
consider potential liability exposure when making client acceptance decisions (Anantharaman,
Pittman, and Wans 2016; Honigsberg, Rajgopal, and Srinivasan 2019) and that this sensitivity to
litigation risk is likely to be heightened in instances where a prospective client is a close competitor

5

of a former client.7 Consistent with auditors being more cautious to avoid actual or perceived
spillovers of client-specific information in the presence of greater liability exposure, I predict and
find that the positive relation between targeted auditor switches and changes in operating
performance is reduced in markets where auditor liability exposure is relatively high.
The fourth and final cross-sectional factor I consider is the extent of a company’s assets
that are made up of inventory (i.e., inventory intensity). One likely mechanism for spillovers of
information relevant to clients’ operations (i.e., “operational information” (Mobbs 2013)) is
through auditors’ knowledge of clients’ inventory management systems. Auditors learn about
clients’ inventory management systems through internal control audit procedures and other audit
procedures (Bhattacharjee, Moreno, and Riley 2012; Feng, Li, McVay, and Skaife 2015), and Feng
et al. (2015) provide evidence that internal controls (specifically controls over inventory
management) have a significant impact on firm operations. Accordingly, I predict and find that the
association targeted auditor switches and changes in operating performance is increasing in
company-level inventory intensity, consistent with the operational value of auditors’ knowledge
being relatively higher for inventory-intensive clients.
To provide further support for my initial interpretation of the results, I next investigate the
source of the operational improvements associated with targeted auditor switches. An
improvement in operating income or operating cash flows can occur through either an increase in
revenues or a reduction in operating expenditures (or through a combination of the two). Because
many of the operational suggestions an auditor can provide a client are typically cost-focused (e.g.,

7

Even absent any intent to disclose proprietary client information, the probability that an auditor faces litigation related
to the disclosure of confidential information is relatively higher in cases where the auditor successively engages with
two or more local market competitors (Cashell and Fuerman 1995; McAllister and Cripe 2008). In addition, auditors
have previously been found liable for breach of confidentiality related to the leakage of sensitive client information
(Werner 2009).
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suggestions related to inventory management and cost center inefficiencies (Metzler 2005; Feng
et al. 2015)), I posit that any improvements in operating performance attributable to auditor
information spillovers are more likely to occur through more efficient capital outlays. Consistent
with this, I find that the operational improvements associated with targeted auditor switches are
driven by reductions in operating expenditures as opposed to increases in revenues.
Next, I investigate whether there is systematic movement (i.e., auditor-client realignments)
in local audit markets consistent with a recognition of the value of auditors’ knowledge of client
operations. If companies recognize the potential operational value of switching to an auditor
formerly engaged with a local market competitor (as suggested by the primary results), then I
expect that these types of switches will occur with abnormal frequency. Specifically, I predict that
companies will be more likely to switch to an auditor formerly engaged with a local market
competitor if a competitor switches auditors in the preceding period (i.e., when the opportunity
exists to engage an auditor with extensive knowledge of a competitor while avoiding any auditor
sharing costs). I test this prediction using multinomial logistic regression (Landsman, Nelson, and
Rountree 2009) and find supporting evidence (i.e., I find that companies are more likely to switch
auditors following a prior-period competitor auditor switch, but only when the subsequently
selected auditor was formerly engaged with a competitor company).8
Finally, I examine the association between targeted auditor switches and both audit pricing
and auditor quality. Prior work documents that companies that switch auditors generally receive
an initial audit fee discount from the incoming auditor. However, given that targeted switches are
associated with subsequent improvements in operating performance, I expect that the agreed-upon
price of the audit will reflect the value of these improvements. Consistent with this, I find that

8

The results reveal that companies are actually less likely to switch to an auditor that was not formerly engaged with
a competitor company following a prior-period competitor auditor switch.
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companies that make targeted auditor switches on average do not receive an audit fee discount
from the incoming auditor. In fact, these companies actually pay a substantial premium to the new
auditor, consistent with the value of targeted auditors’ knowledge being impounded into the price
of the audit. While I attribute this audit fee premium to the association between targeted auditor
switches and subsequent improvements in operating performance, a possible alternative
explanation is that companies making targeted switches are motivated by a desire for higher
auditor quality (i.e., it is plausible that targeted auditors provide higher quality on average relative
to other auditors and companies making targeted switches are willing to pay a premium for a
higher-quality auditor). Using preceding audit failure rates to proxy for auditor quality, I find no
evidence that companies making targeted switches subsequently select higher-quality auditors. In
fact, I find that these companies on average subsequently select auditors with greater preceding
audit failure rates relative to both companies making non-targeted switches and companies that do
not switch auditors.
This study contributes to the literatures on auditor information spillovers and audit
(auditor) value. First, I provide evidence suggesting that proprietary information is transferred
across companies via external auditors and that auditor information spillovers are associated with
significant operational benefits for the companies to which the information is likely being
transferred. Specifically, the results reveal that companies that make targeted auditor switches
realize significant subsequent improvements in both operating income and operating cash flows.
In addition, I provide evidence that the association between targeted switches and improvements
in operating performance varies predictably with several across- and within-market factors. More
broadly, the collective evidence in this paper suggests that the value of an audit (auditor) is
associated with the auditor’s informational capital and extends beyond that which is traditionally
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considered by investors and other capital market participants (Healy and Palepu 2001).9 Given that
auditors accumulate more information about their clients than arguably any other external party
(KPMG 2014), my findings should be of interest to wide range of stakeholders, including
managers, board members, investors, and regulators.
Second, the results of this study suggest that companies’ concerns over sharing an auditor
with a competitor are justified. Recent work on auditor-related proprietary information spillovers
generally finds that companies are reluctant to share an auditor with a competitor due to concerns
over proprietary information leakage. I add to this literature by documenting that companies appear
to target auditors that are likely to hold proprietary information related to their competitor(s) and
that the ex post consequences associated with these targeted auditor switches are consistent with
the transfer of operational information across companies. While my research design differs from
related studies in that I do not examine concurrent auditor sharing between competitor companies,
my results suggest that concerns over auditor sharing are likely based on real information spillover
costs and that these costs are potentially relevant to the auditor selection process.
2. Background and Hypothesis Development
There is considerable anecdotal evidence suggesting that companies have concerns about
their proprietary information being shared with competitors via their auditor. For example,
following the merger of Ernst & Whinney (Coca-Cola’s auditor) with Arthur Young (PepsiCo’s
auditor), Ernst and Young resigned as PepsiCo’s auditor due to Coca-Cola’s concerns over sharing
an auditor with a major competitor (Berton and Niebuhr 1990; Cowan 1990). In addition, Frederick
Zuckerman, the former treasurer of Chrysler, echoed a similar sentiment in stating that, “It’d be

9

Traditional views of the value of an audit (auditor) focus primarily on the value of the financial statement audit and
the value of the auditor’s public communications (e.g., the issuance of a going concern opinion or other modified
language in the audit report) (Healy and Palepu 2001; DeFond and Zhang 2014).

9

very awkward to have the same auditor for two large firms…Clients may feel uncomfortable
knowing that their corporate secrets are lying just a few files away from papers of their arch rivals”
(Tierney 1989). These concerns are not unique to the auditor-client setting. Prior work in the
management literature documents that companies are reluctant to join industry trade groups over
fears of proprietary information leakage to competitors (Grindley, Mowery, and Silverman 1994).
There is also considerable extant research on proprietary information acquisition and sharing by
suppliers, both for suppliers of tangible goods and suppliers of services (Li and Lin 2006;
Sengupta, Heiser, and Cook 2006; Anand and Goyal 2009; Kong, Rajagopalan, and Zhang 2013;
Tan, Wong, and Chung 2016).
Despite the anecdotal evidence described above, there is relatively little empirical evidence
on the existence or consequences of auditors’ leakages of proprietary client information.10 Aobdia
(2015) documents that companies are reluctant to share an auditor with a rival due to concerns
over information spillover. Additionally, Bills et al. (2020) document that, despite the potential
benefits of sharing an auditor with an industry peer, companies are reluctant to share an auditor in
settings where the costs of information leakage to competitors are higher. In another concurrent
working paper, Kang et al. (2020) examine information spillover concerns at the audit partner level
and find that rival companies are less likely to share the same partner when they are more
concerned about confidential proprietary information.11 While these studies focus on companies’
concerns over concurrent auditor sharing, I investigate auditor information spillovers using a
setting where the potential costs of concurrent auditor sharing are nonexistent. An advantage of

10

Case law reveals that auditors have faced legal actions related to the transfer of sensitive client information. In one
well-publicized case (Consolidata Services v. Alexander Grant), the audit firm Grant Thornton was prosecuted after
it was determined that the firm shared information related to the operations of one client to its other clients (Werner
2009).
11
Other recent studies examine the effects of auditor sharing in the context of M&A transactions (i.e., where the target
company and the acquirer company share the same auditor) (Cai et al. 2016; Dhaliwal, Lamoreaux, Litov, and Neyland
2016).
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my setting is that I avoid any potential selection bias that is likely to exist when two competitor
companies concurrently share the same auditor. Selection bias could affect the inferences of
studies that examine concurrent auditor sharing because in these instances both companies make
the choice to engage the same auditor in the same period.12
The studies outlined in the preceding paragraph generally find that companies are reluctant
to share an auditor when the perceived risk of information spillover is greater and infer that
companies’ reluctance over auditor sharing is based on the concern that, given their unique access
to client information, auditors have the opportunity to facilitate the transfer of this sensitive
information (either intentionally or unintentionally) to the benefit of a competitor company. In a
similar vein, McAllister and Cripe (2008) note that auditors often accumulate proprietary
information about clients and have ample opportunities to pass this information to other clients.
Furthermore, in contrast to the explicit sharing of client secrets, the use of “best practices” provides
auditors with an institutionalized channel for information transfer.13
To test for evidence of auditor information spillovers, I identify instances where a company
chooses to switch to an auditor that was dismissed by (or resigned from) a local market competitor
company in the immediately preceding period. In these cases, the opportunity to benefit from an
auditor’s proprietary knowledge is relatively greater (e.g., companies making these types of
switches can subsequently interact with audit personnel that are likely to have in-depth knowledge

12

Another challenge in studying concurrent auditor sharing is that competitor companies that concurrently share an
auditor are simultaneously exposed to both the costs and benefits of auditor information spillovers.
13
McDonald (2013) provides further insights into the use of best practices as a channel for information transfer by
professional service providers in his book on the management consulting firm McKinsey & Company. McDonald
(2013, p. 5) states: “McKinsey offers a kind of industrial espionage couched in the language of ‘best practices.’ Want
to know what the competition is up to? Hire McKinsey. After all, it’s working with everyone else as well. The flip
side of that argument is that your competitors find out about you too.” The recent shift by accounting firms towards
an increased emphasis on consulting services (Lisic, Myers, Pawlewicz, and Seidel 2019; Cowle, Kleppe, Moon, and
Shipman 2019) likely increases the opportunity for this form of information transfer as accounting firms accumulate
even more proprietary client information.
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of a close market competitor), and the potential costs of concurrent auditor sharing are nonexistent
(because the selected auditor is no longer engaged with the competitor company). I refer to these
types of auditor switches as “targeted auditor switches” since the decision to switch to a specific
auditor that just ended a relationship with a local market competitor company is suggestive of an
intent (at least in some cases) to benefit from auditor information spillovers.14
If a company chooses to incur the costs of switching auditors, it stands that the company
considers the expected benefits of the switch to outweigh the expected costs of the switch. As
suggested above, one potential benefit of a targeted auditor switch is the opportunity to acquire
proprietary competitor information via the incoming auditor. Auditors have unique access to client
information and often develop a deep understanding of their clients’ operations, strategic plans,
and competitive forces (Fontaine, Letaifa, and Herda 2013; KPMG 2014; Cai et al. 2016).15
Furthermore, extant evidence suggests that this proprietary information can be shared (either
intentionally or unintentionally) across an auditor’s portfolio of clients (Cahan et al. 2008; Werner
2009; Rapoport 2013). Importantly, prior research also provides several reasons to expect that the
value of any auditor information spillovers could extend beyond a client’s financial reporting
function into the operational aspects of the client’s business. First, prior work documents that
auditors have broad access to client operations and often provide suggestions to clients regarding
operational issues (Eilifsen et al. 2001; KPMG 2014; Cai et al. 2016). Second, Aobdia (2015)
provides evidence suggesting that company managers’ discretionary decisions (e.g., decisions
related to company operations) can be influenced by the company’s auditor. Finally, given the

14

I acknowledge that not all switches I define as targeted switches are necessarily made with the explicit intent to
benefit from auditor information spillovers.
15
For example, an anonymous CFO surveyed by Fontaine et al. (2013, p. A10) made the following statement in
regards to the external auditor’s involvement in the company’s strategic planning: “We will discuss our strategy [with
our auditor]. This is an occasion to demonstrate that [our auditor] takes to heart what happens in our company.” The
same CFO also stated that the auditor does this “to better understand our company and our business” (Fontaine et al.
2013, p. A11).
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depth of knowledge that is necessary to satisfactorily conduct a public company audit in the current
regulatory regime, auditors arguably know more about a client’s business operations than any other
outside party (SEC 2000; PCAOB 2010; KPMG 2014). Accordingly, I expect that companies that
make targeted auditor switches on average will benefit from auditor information spillovers in the
form of subsequent improvements in operating performance. Specifically, my primary hypothesis
is stated as follows (in alternative form):
Hypothesis: Companies that make “targeted auditor switches” realize greater subsequent
improvements in operating performance relative to both companies that do not switch
auditors and companies that make non-targeted auditor switches.
Although I predict that targeted auditor switches will be associated with significant
improvements in operating performance, there are reasons why this prediction may not hold. First,
liability risk is often a significant concern for auditors (Laux and Newman 2010; Anantharaman
et al. 2016; Honigsberg et al. 2019), and the possibility of substantial legal costs resulting from
accusations (whether substantiated or not) of violations of client confidentiality could motivate
auditors to establish safeguards to prevent any leakages of proprietary client information.
Additionally, it is possible that any informational capital held by a targeted auditor is only
beneficial to the client insofar as it helps to improve the client’s financial reporting function (i.e.,
auditor information spillovers may not provide significant operational value on average). In this
case, I would not expect to find an association between targeted auditor switches and subsequent
improvements in operating performance.
3. Research Methodology and Sample
3.1 Test of Primary Hypothesis
To investigate the relation between targeted auditor switches and subsequent changes in

13

company operating performance, I estimate the following equation:
ΔOpPerft+2,t = δ0 + δ1TargetSwitcht + δ2OtherSwitcht + δ3Aget + δ4Casht + δ5CEOChanget
+ δ6DiscAcct + δ7GoingConcernt + δ8Growtht + δ9InvRect + δ10Leveraget
+ δ11Losst + δ12M&At + δ13ModOpiniont + δ14ROAt + δ15Sizet + Industry FE
+ Year FE + ε.
(1)
The dependent variable in Equation (1) is ΔOpPerf, which represents one of two proxies
for changes in company operating performance. Following Barber and Lyon (1996), I define the
first proxy as ΔOpInc, the two-year change in the company’s operating income scaled by average
total assets.16 The second proxy is ΔOpCF, the two-year change in the company’s operating cash
flows scaled by average total assets (Wasley and Wu 2006). I measure the changes in operating
performance over a two-year period (i.e., from t to t+2) because I expect that any meaningful
improvements in operating performance are not likely to materialize immediately following an
auditor switch, especially for switches occurring later in a fiscal year. Moreover, a two-year
measurement window is consistent with prior studies that examine changes in operating
performance following major corporate events (e.g., IPOs, M&A activity, increases in executive
stock ownership) (Kaplan 1989; Degeorge and Zeckhauser 1993; Core and Larcker 2002).
The two variables of interest are TargetSwitch and OtherSwitch. TargetSwitch is an
indicator variable equal to one if the company switches auditors and the incoming auditor was
dismissed by (or resigned from) one of the company’s local market (based on metropolitan
statistical area (MSA) and two-digit SIC industry) competitors in the preceding period, and zero
otherwise. OtherSwitch is an indicator variable equal to one for all other auditor switches. I define
markets based on MSA and industry for two reasons. First, prior work documents that auditors
compete at the city-industry level (Francis, Reichelt, and Wang 2005; Numan and Willekens 2012;
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As articulated in Barber and Lyon (1996), operating income is a superior proxy for operating performance because
it is not obscured by special items, tax considerations, and other non-operating items and therefore provides a clean
measure of the productivity of operating assets.
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Chu, Simunic, Ye, and Zhang 2018). Second, I expect auditor information spillovers to be more
prevalent at the local market level, primarily due to a higher likelihood of overlap in audit team
personnel. My primary hypothesis predicts that the coefficient on TargetSwitcht (δ1) will be
positive (i.e., targeted switches will be associated with greater improvements in operating
performance relative to non-switches) and that δ1 will be more positive than the coefficient on
OtherSwitcht (δ2) (i.e., targeted switches will be associated with greater improvements in operating
performance relative to other switches).
The control variables included in Equation (1) are based on prior research that examines
auditor switches (e.g., Landsman et al. 2009) and changes in company operating performance (e.g.,
Kim, Kitsabunnarat, and Nofsinger 2004; Blackwell, Dudney, and Farrell 2007). Specifically, I
control for several company characteristics including age (Age), cash on hand (Cash), growth
(Growth), leverage (Leverage), current financial performance (Loss, ROA), and total assets (Size).
I also control for several audit risk factors including financial reporting quality (DiscAcc), the ratio
of inventory and receivables to total assets (InvRec), and whether the company receives a going
concern opinion (GoingConcern) or some other modified audit opinion (ModOpinion).
Additionally, I include controls for whether the company reports merger and/or acquisition activity
(M&A) and whether the company experiences executive turnover (CEOChange). Finally, I include
two-digit SIC industry and fiscal year fixed effects.17
3.2 Sample
The primary sample consists of company-year observations spanning fiscal years 2002
through 2016. I begin the sample period in 2002 as this is the first year with complete data

17

Although I use robust regression as the primary specification for estimations of Equation (1) (see Section 4.2), I
winsorize all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th levels to reduce the effects of outliers for all descriptive analyses
and OLS regression analyses. Inferences from these analyses are similar if I do not winsorize.
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necessary for my empirical tests.18 The sample period ends in 2016 to allow sufficient time to
calculate the two-year changes in operating performance discussed in Section 3.1. I obtain
financial statement and other company data from Compustat and auditor-related data from Audit
Analytics. The sample selection process is outlined in Table 1. I begin with a sample of 94,781
company-year observations, which represents the intersection of Compustat and Audit Analytics
for the full sample period. Next, I delete observations without necessary data for the construction
of the test and control variables. Finally, I limit the sample to MSA-industry-years with at least
three observations. I impose this restriction to ensure that each company-year in the sample has a
reasonable “opportunity” to make a targeted auditor switch (i.e., without sufficient local market
competition in a given year, a company is precluded from making a targeted switch).19 After
implementing these restrictions, the final sample consists of 27,644 company-year observations.
4. Empirical Results
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Descriptive statistics for the full sample are presented in Table 2. The mean rate of auditor
switches in the sample is approximately eight percent (sum of TargetSwitcht and OtherSwitcht),
and targeted auditor switches represent just over one-half percent of the full sample and over six
percent of all switches.20 The mean (median) two-year change in operating income is –0.009 (–
0.001), and the mean (median) two-year change in operating cash flows is –0.007 (–0.002). These
values suggest that both proxies for changes in operating performance are distributed around zero

18

To ensure that my inferences are not affected by the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), I re-estimate
each of my tests after excluding observations before fiscal year 2004. My inferences are unchanged throughout.
19
My inferences are not contingent on this design choice. Specifically, if I re-estimate each of my tests without this
sample restriction, my inferences are unchanged throughout.
20
The eight percent switch rate is slightly higher than the rates in some prior papers on auditor switches. This is due
in part to the sample restriction I impose that requires each MSA-industry-year to have at least three observations.
Without this restriction, the mean rate of auditor switches is more comparable to prior work. Again, inferences are
similar if this sample restriction is not imposed.
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in the full sample. The distributions of the remaining variables are generally consistent with prior
literature.
Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients for the variables employed in the study are
presented in Table 3. Coefficients reported in bold and italics are significant at the ten percent
level. As shown, there is a positive and significant correlation between targeted auditor switches
(TargetSwitcht) and both changes in operating income (ΔOpInct+2,t) and changes in operating cash
flows (ΔOpCFt+2,t), providing initial univariate evidence in support of my primary hypothesis.
Conversely, the correlations between non-targeted switches (OtherSwitcht) and both measures of
changes in operating performance are negative but not statistically significant.
4.2 Test of Primary Hypothesis
The results of the estimations of Equation (1) used to test the relation between targeted
auditor switches and changes in operating performance are presented in Table 4. Given the
relatively low number of “treatment” observations (i.e., targeted switch observations), I estimate
these tests using robust regression to ensure that my results are not unduly affected by influential
observations (Ryan, Tucker, and Zhou 2016; Kelly, Presslee, and Webb 2017; Leone, MinuttiMeza, and Wasley 2019).21 Column (1) presents the results of estimations of Equation (1) with
changes in operating income (ΔOpInct+2,t) as the dependent variable, and Column (2) presents the
results with changes in operating cash flows (ΔOpCFt+2,t) as the dependent variable.22 The
variables of interest are TargetSwitcht and OtherSwitcht. As reported, the coefficient on
TargetSwitcht is positive and significant in each estimation (p < 0.01 in both Columns), suggesting

21

As discussed in Section 5.3, the results of these tests are similar if I instead use OLS regression.
For robustness, I re-estimate both of these tests after decile-ranking each dependent variable. I do this to ensure that
the results of the primary tests are not a function of the distributional properties of the dependent variables (i.e., to
ensure that the results hold across the distribution of each variable). The results using the decile-ranked measures are
similar to the main results and are discussed in detail in Section 5.3.
22
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that companies that make targeted auditor switches realize greater subsequent improvements in
operating performance relative to companies that do not switch auditors. The coefficient on
OtherSwitcht is insignificant in each case. In addition, I report the tests of the difference in the
coefficients on TargetSwitcht and OtherSwitcht at the bottom of Table 4. As shown, the coefficient
on TargetSwitcht is significantly greater than the coefficient on OtherSwitcht in each estimation (p
< 0.01 in Column 1; p < 0.05 in Column 2). This suggests that companies that make targeted
switches also realize greater subsequent improvements in operating performance relative to
companies that make non-targeted switches, therefore providing evidence that the association
between targeted switches and changes in operating performance is not attributable to auditor
switches in general. Economically, the estimated increase in two-year operating income growth
(operating cash flow growth) for companies that make targeted switches is approximately 19.3
percent (16.0 percent) of the interquartile range of each respective measure.23 In summary, the
results reported in Table 4 provide support for my primary hypothesis.
4.3 Cross-Sectional Analyses
In this section, I investigate whether the results of my primary hypothesis tests vary
predictably based on specific cross-sectional factors that are likely to influence the relation
between targeted auditor switches and changes in company operating performance. I consider both
across-market (i.e., industry- or geographic-level) factors and within-market (i.e., company-level)
factors that are likely to affect this relation.
4.3.1 Industry Concentration
The first factor I consider is industry concentration. Ali et al. (2014) examine the
association between industry concentration and corporate disclosure policy and find that
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These estimates are calculated as follows for operating income growth (operating cash flow growth): coefficient
estimate of 0.0174 (0.0162) reported in Table 4 divided by interquartile range of 0.090 (0.101) derived from Table 2.
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companies in concentrated industries have more restrictive disclosure polices, presumably due to
higher proprietary costs of disclosure. Ali et al. (2014) posit that proprietary costs are higher in
concentrated industries because, in these industries, one company’s information is relatively more
valuable to the company’s competitors and thus competitors are more likely to take advantage of
any leakages (whether intentional or unintentional) of proprietary information. Motivated by the
findings of Ali et al. (2014), I examine whether the association between targeted auditor switches
and changes in operating performance varies with industry concentration. If the operational
improvements associated with targeted switches are in fact attributable (at least in part) to
spillovers of proprietary information via the auditor, then I expect that the improvements in
operating performance will be more pronounced as industry concentration increases.
To test this prediction, I follow prior research (e.g., Hutton, Lee, and Shu 2012; Ali et al.
2014; Amiram, Kalay, and Sadka 2017) and use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index to proxy for
industry concentration. Specifically, I define industry concentration by year as the sum of the
squares of market share (based on total revenues) for each company in a two-digit SIC industry
(IndConc).24 Then, I re-estimate both specifications of Equation (1) after including IndConct as an
additional independent variable, along with the interaction of TargetSwitcht and IndConct. As
outlined above, I expect a positive coefficient on the interaction of TargetSwitcht and IndConct.
The results of these tests are presented in Table 5. Consistent with my prediction, the coefficient
estimate on TargetSwitcht * IndConct is positive and significant in each estimation (p < 0.05 in
Column 1; p < 0.01 in Column 2). These results reveal that the association between changes in
operating performance and targeted auditor switches is increasing in industry concentration,
consistent with targeted switches resulting in greater operational benefits for companies in

24

The results are similar if I instead use a modified Herfindahl-Hirschman index that adjusts for the number of
companies within an industry-year (Dunn, Kohlbeck, and Mayhew 2011).
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industries with relatively higher proprietary costs of disclosure.
4.3.2 Enforceability of Non-Compete Agreements
The second factor I consider is the strength of non-compete agreement enforcement. As an
alternative to hiring a rival company’s former auditor, companies can benefit from information
spillovers through hiring individuals currently (or formerly) employed by a market competitor.
Companies often use non-compete agreements to protect themselves from the transfer (either
intentionally or unintentionally) of proprietary information to a competitor through a former
employee (Davis, Reicin, and Warren 2015). Prior research also shows that the strength of the
enforceability of these non-compete agreements (which varies across states) affects the likelihood
of this form of information spillover. Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming (2009) and Garmaise (2011)
find that employee movement between rival companies is restricted in states with stronger noncompete enforcement, thus leading to less information spillover through this channel (Belenzon
and Schankerman 2013). More directly relevant to my setting, Aobdia (2015) provides evidence
that rival companies are less likely to share an auditor when headquartered in states with stronger
non-compete enforcement, consistent with auditor sharing costs being higher when employee
movement is restricted. Accordingly, I expect that the positive association between targeted
switches and changes in operating performance will be more pronounced for companies
headquartered in states with relatively stronger enforcement of non-compete agreements given the
reduced ability of these companies to benefit from information spillovers through hiring a
competitor’s employees.
To test this prediction, I use a state-by-state index of non-compete enforceability
formulated by Bishara (2011) and subsequently evaluated by Barnett and Sichelman (2020).
Bishara (2011) systematically reviews both case law and state legislation to assess the relative
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strength of non-compete enforcement across states at two points in time (1991 and 2009). Bishara
(2011) then ranks each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia from 1 (strongest
enforcement) to 51 (weakest enforcement) at each point in time.25 Using these rankings, I define
an indicator variable (Enforce) equal to one for audit engagements that occur in state-years in the
top half of Bishara’s (2011) rankings (i.e., state-years with relatively strong non-compete
enforcement). For years prior to 2009 I use the 1991 rankings to define Enforce, and for years
2009 and after I use the 2009 rankings. Then, I re-estimate both specifications of Equation (1) after
including Enforcet as an additional independent variable, along with the interaction of
TargetSwitcht and Enforcet. Because stronger non-compete enforcement increases the likelihood
that companies will seek information spillover via the auditor, I expect a positive coefficient on
the interaction of TargetSwitcht and Enforcet. The results of these tests are presented in Table 6.
Consistent with my prediction, the coefficient estimate on TargetSwitcht * Enforcet is positive and
significant in each estimation (p < 0.05 in both Columns), suggesting that the operational benefits
associated with targeted auditor switches are greater in markets where non-compete enforcement
is stronger.26
4.3.3 Auditor Liability Exposure
The third factor I consider is auditor liability exposure. Prior work documents that auditors
are sensitive to litigation risk and consider their potential liability exposure when making client
acceptance decisions (Laux and Newman 2010; Anantharaman et al. 2016; Honigsberg et al.

Barnett and Sichelman (2020) review Bishara’s (2011) rankings, and their analysis suggests that Bishara’s (2011)
rankings as of 2009 are reliable through the end of my sample period.
26
The coefficient on TargetSwitcht is insignificant in both estimations, and the linear combination of the coefficients
on TargetSwitcht and TargetSwitcht * Enforcet is significantly positive (p < 0.01) in both estimations. These results
suggest that the operational improvements associated with targeted switches are concentrated in state-years with
relatively strong non-compete enforcement. However, inferences on the coefficient of interest are similar if I define
Enforce using the actual index ranking (1 to 51) instead of dichotomizing at the median ranking, suggesting that the
association between targeted auditor switches and changes in operating performance is increasing across the
distribution of the strength of non-compete agreement enforcement.
25
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2019). In addition, auditors are likely to be relatively more sensitive to litigation risk in instances
where a prospective client is a close competitor of a previous client. This is because, even absent
any intent to disclose proprietary client information, the probability that an auditor faces litigation
related to the disclosure of proprietary information is relatively higher in cases where the auditor
successively engages with two or more local market competitors (Cashell and Fuerman 1995;
McAllister and Cripe 2008). These litigation concerns are substantive given that auditors have
historically faced legal actions related to the transfer of sensitive client information. For example,
Grant Thornton was found liable for breach of confidentiality after sharing information related to
the operations of one client to its other clients (Werner 2009). The precedent from this case (and
several other similar cases) provides a strong incentive for auditors to avoid any actual or perceived
leakages of information across clients in the face of more severe liability exposure (Aobdia 2015).
Accordingly, I expect that the positive relation between changes in operating performance and
targeted auditor switches will be reduced in markets where auditor liability exposure is relatively
greater.
To test this, I use the state-level liability-sharing index from Gaver, Paterson, and Pacini
(2012) and Anantharaman et al. (2016) to define an indicator variable (HighLiab) equal to one for
audit engagements that occur in state-years with the most stringent form of third-party legal
liability (i.e., full joint-and-several liability).27,

27

28

Then, I re-estimate both specifications of

This index is created based on the liability-sharing rules applied in each state across time. The index is developed
from state-level summaries of joint-and-several liability reform by the American Tort Reform Association (2014).
Prior work documents that third-party liability standards affect overall auditor litigation risk (e.g., Linville (2011)
finds that auditors in states with more stringent third-party liability pay higher malpractice insurance premiums).
28
The index assigns a value of 0 to state-years that follow a proportionate liability standard (least stringent form of
third-party liability), 0.5 to state-years that follow a modified joint-and-several liability standard (moderately stringent
form of third-party liability), and 1 to state-years that follow a full joint-and-several liability standard (most stringent
form of third-party liability). If I define HighLiab using the actual index ranking (0, 0.5, or 1) instead of dichotomizing,
the result holds for the test of changes in operating income, but the negative coefficient on the interaction of interest
is no longer significant at conventional levels for the test of changes in operating cash flows (p = 0.273).
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Equation (1) after including HighLiabt as an additional independent variable, along with the
interaction of TargetSwitcht and HighLiabt. Following Anantharaman et al. (2016), I limit the
sample for this test to observations in 2009 and earlier since the state-level liability index is only
updated through 2009.29 If greater liability exposure reduces the likelihood of auditor information
spillover, I expect a negative coefficient on the interaction of TargetSwitcht and HighLiabt. The
results of these tests are presented in Table 7. Consistent with my prediction, the coefficient
estimate on TargetSwitcht * HighLiabt is negative and significant in each estimation (p < 0.01 in
Column 1; p < 0.10 in Column 2). These results reveal that the operational benefits of targeted
auditor switches are reduced in markets where auditors face the possibility of more severe legal
liability, consistent with relatively less auditor information spillover occurring in these markets.30
4.3.4 Inventory Intensity
The fourth and final cross-sectional factor I consider is the extent of a company’s assets
that are made up of inventory (i.e., inventory intensity). Auditors learn about clients’ inventory
management systems through internal control audit procedures and other audit procedures
(Bhattacharjee et al. 2012; Feng et al. 2015). Accordingly, I posit that one likely mechanism for
spillovers of operational information is through auditors’ knowledge of clients’ inventory
management systems. This proposed link is further supported by Feng et al. (2015), who provide
evidence that internal controls (specifically controls over inventory management) have a

29

If I include observations post-2009, the result holds for the test of changes in operating income, but the negative
coefficient on the interaction of interest is no longer significant at conventional levels for the test of changes in
operating cash flows (p = 0.159). However, I hesitate to extrapolate the index beyond 2009 given the significant
changes in auditor liability laws over the past decade (Anantharaman et al. 2016; Honigsberg et al. 2019).
30
The linear combination of the coefficients on TargetSwitcht and TargetSwitcht * HighLiabt is insignificant in both
estimations, which suggests that there is no significant association between targeted switches and changes in operating
performance for state-years that follow the most stringent form of third-party legal liability. However, the coefficient
on TargetSwitcht is positive and significant (p < 0.01 in Column 1; p < 0.10 in Column 2) in both estimations,
suggesting that targeted auditor switches are associated with significant improvements in operating performance for
all other observations (i.e., state-years with a moderate or low third-party liability standard).
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significant impact on firm operations. Inventory management is a critical component of a
company’s operational strategy, and weaknesses in inventory controls are likely to lead to higher
inventory-related costs (Feng et al. 2015). In addition, auditors often communicate about
operational issues identified in clients’ inventory management processes, as well as provide
recommendations to address such issues, through informal discussions with management and
through management letter comments (Moreno and Bhattacharjee 2003; Metzler 2005; Aronson
LLC 2014). Given the evidence outlined above suggesting that the operational value of an auditor’s
knowledge is likely to be relatively greater for inventory-related issues, I expect that the
operational improvements associated with targeted auditor switches will be more pronounced for
inventory-intensive companies.
To test this, I follow prior research and generate a measure of inventory intensity for each
company-year in the sample. Specifically, I define InvIntens as the ratio of total inventories
(including the LIFO reserve) to total assets (Mauler 2019). Then, I re-estimate both specifications
of Equation (1) after including InvIntenst as an additional independent variable, along with the
interaction of TargetSwitcht and InvIntenst. As outlined above, I predict that the association
between targeted auditor switches and changes in operating performance will be increasing in
company-level inventory intensity, and thus I expect a positive coefficient on the interaction of
TargetSwitcht and InvIntenst. The results of these tests are presented in Table 8. Consistent with
my prediction, the coefficient estimate on TargetSwitcht * InvIntenst is positive and significant in
each estimation (p < 0.05 in Column 1; p < 0.01 in Column 2).31

31

If I include each of the cross-sectional variables described above (IndConct, Enforcet, HighLiabt, and InvIntenst) as
additional explanatory variables in the primary estimation of Equation (1), my inferences are unchanged throughout.
In addition, my inferences from each of the cross-sectional tests discussed in this section are unchanged if I interact
the cross-sectional variable of interest with each of the other explanatory variables (i.e., the results are robust to a
fully-interacted specification).
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4.4 Source of Operating Performance Improvements
To provide further support for my initial interpretation of the results, I next investigate the
source of the operational improvements associated with targeted auditor switches. Improvements
in operating performance can occur through either increases in revenues or reductions in operating
expenditures (or through a combination of the two). As discussed above, auditors are most likely
to have an impact on client operations through cost-focused recommendations (e.g.,
recommendations related to inventory management and cost center inefficiencies (Metzler 2005;
Feng et al. 2015)). This would suggest that any operating performance improvements associated
with auditor information spillovers are more likely to occur through more efficient capital outlays.
Accordingly, if my initial interpretation of the relation between targeted auditor switches and
changes in operating performance is correct, then I expect targeted switches will be associated
with relatively greater reductions in operating expenditures.
To test this prediction, I define two new variables. First, I define DecreaseOpExp as an
indicator variable equal to one if the two-year percentage change in the company’s ratio of
operating expenses to revenues is below the median change for the full sample, and zero otherwise.
This variable indicates companies that realize greater reductions in operating expenditures
(adjusted for the company’s level of revenues) relative to the broader market over the same period
where I measure changes in operating performance in my primary tests.32 Second, I define
IncreaseRevt as an indicator variable equal to one if the two-year percentage change in the
company’s revenues is above the median change for the full sample, and zero otherwise.33 In

I adjust for a company’s level of revenues because a company’s expected level of operating expenses is likely highly
related to its level of revenues. Thus, in order to assess the efficiency of a company’s capital outlays, it is necessary
to benchmark against the company’s level of revenues.
33
Inferences are similar if I instead decile-rank two-year percentage changes in the ratio of operating expenses to
revenues to define DecreaseOpExp and decile-rank two-year percentage changes in revenues to define IncreaseRevt.
32
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contrast to DecreaseOpExp, IncreaseRevt indicates companies that realize greater increases in
revenues relative to the broader market. I then separately re-estimate a modified form of Equation
(1) after substituting DecreaseOpExpt+2,t and IncreaseRevtt+2,t as the dependent variable,
respectively. As outlined above, I predict that the coefficient on TargetSwitcht will be positive in
the DecreaseOpExpt+2,t estimation, consistent with targeted auditor switches being associated with
reductions in operating expenditures.
The results of these tests are presented in Table 9. Column 1 reports the results with
DecreaseOpExpt+2,t as the dependent variable. Consistent with my prediction, the coefficient on
TargetSwitcht is positive and significant (p < 0.05). In addition, the coefficient on TargetSwitcht is
significantly greater than the coefficient on OtherSwitcht as reported at the bottom of the table.
Column 2 reports the results with IncreaseRevtt+2,t as the dependent variable. As shown, the
coefficient on TargetSwitcht is insignificant in this estimation, while the coefficient on
OtherSwitcht is negative and significant. Overall, the results reported in Table 9 suggest that the
improvements in operating performance associated with targeted auditor switches are driven by
expenditure reductions as opposed to revenue increases and thereby provide further support for
my interpretation of the primary results.
5. Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests
5.1 Test of Auditor-Client Realignments
I use this section to investigate whether there is systematic movement (i.e., auditor-client
realignments) in local audit markets consistent with a recognition of the value of auditors’
knowledge of client operations. If companies recognize the potential operational value of
switching to an auditor formerly engaged with a local market competitor, then I expect that these
types of switches will occur with abnormal frequency. In other words, I expect that companies will
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be more likely to switch to an auditor formerly engaged with a local market competitor if there is
an auditor change within the local market in the preceding period. I expect this type of systematic
movement following a prior-period competitor auditor switch because, in these instances,
companies have the opportunity to engage an auditor with extensive knowledge of a local market
competitor without bearing any auditor sharing costs. Despite this prediction, it is possible that the
costs of switching auditors (Skinner and Srinivasan 2012) outweigh the expected value of any
benefits of making this type of auditor change. If this is true on average, then I would not expect
to observe the predicted systematic movement in the affected markets.
To test my prediction, I begin by defining MarketSwitch as an indicator variable equal to
one if a local market competitor company switches auditors, and zero otherwise. I then use
multinomial logistic regression (Landsman et al. 2009) to simultaneously test whether, following
a prior-period competitor auditor switch (i.e., when MarketSwitcht-1 = 1), companies are more
likely in period t to switch to an auditor formerly engaged with a local market competitor versus
switch to an auditor not formerly engaged with a local market competitor, relative to the choice to
not switch auditors (i.e., the reference group). I include the same set of control variables from
Equation (1), along with three additional variables (Expert, Mismatch, and Tenure) commonly
employed in the auditor switching literature (e.g., Landsman et al. 2009).34 These three variables
are excluded from Equation (1) because they are potential outcomes of an auditor switch and thus
are “bad controls” (Angrist and Pischke 2015; Swanquist and Whited 2018).35 As outlined above,
I predict that companies will be more likely to switch to an auditor formerly engaged with a

34

Expert indicates whether the auditor is an industry expert, Mismatch indicates whether the auditor and client are
“mismatched” following the methodology in Shu (2000), and Tenure represents auditor tenure. All three variables are
formally defined in Appendix B.
35
Nonetheless, inferences throughout the paper are unchanged if I include these three variables in estimations of
Equation (1).
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competitor following a prior-period competitor auditor switch (i.e., I expect a positive association
between MarketSwitcht-1 and switches to a competitor’s former auditor). I make no prediction for
the relation between MarketSwitcht-1 and switches to auditors not formerly engaged with a
competitor.
The results of this multinomial logistic regression estimation are presented in Table 10. As
noted above, the reference group consists of companies that do not switch auditors in period t.
Column 1 reports the results for companies that switch in period t to an auditor that was engaged
with a local market competitor in period t-1, and Column 2 reports the results for companies that
switch to all other auditors in period t. Consistent with my prediction, the coefficient on
MarketSwitcht-1 is positive and significant in Column 1 (p < 0.01). In contrast, the coefficient on
MarketSwitcht-1 in Column 2 is negative and significant. Taken together, these results suggest that
companies are more likely to switch auditors following a prior-period competitor auditor switch,
but only when the subsequently selected auditor was engaged with a competitor company in the
preceding period. More broadly, these results provide evidence of systematic movement within
local audit markets consistent with a recognition of the potential operational value of auditor
information spillovers.
5.2 Audit Pricing and Auditor Quality
5.2.1 Targeted Auditor Switches and Audit Pricing
To provide further insights into targeted auditor switches, I next examine the relation
between these types of switches and audit pricing. Prior work documents that companies that
switch auditors often receive a “first-year” audit fee discount from the incoming auditor
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(DeAngelo 1981; Craswell and Francis 1999; Doogar, Sivadasan, and Solomon 2015).36 However,
given that the switches I define as targeted are associated with subsequent improvements in
operating performance, I expect that the agreed-upon price of the audit will reflect the value of
these improvements and thus targeted switches will be associated with a higher initial audit price
relative to non-targeted switches. Consistent with this, analytical work predicts that the price of an
audit should reflect the value of the auditor’s informational capital (Elitzur and Falk 1996; Chan
1999). On the other hand, one of the necessary conditions of a targeted switch is that the targeted
auditor loses at least one local market client in the preceding period. This condition could result in
excess capacity for the auditor (i.e., excess audit supply), which in turn could lead to a reduction
in audit price for these types of engagements.
I test the relation between targeted auditor switches and audit pricing by performing
comparisons based on the abnormal audit fee paid to the auditor for each observation in the sample.
To calculate the abnormal audit fee, I regress the natural logarithm of audit fees paid to the
company’s auditor in year t on the same set of control variables from Equation (1).37 For each
company-year observation, I then define the residual from this regression estimation as the
abnormal audit fee (AbnFeet) (Doogar et al. 2015). I then compare the mean values of AbnFeet
across companies that make targeted switches (TargetSwitcht = 1) and three comparison groups,
including all other companies in the sample (TargetSwitcht = 0), companies that do not switch
auditors (Switcht = 0), and companies that make non-targeted switches (OtherSwitcht = 1).38

36

Barua, Lennox, and Raghunandan (2019) suggest that the inferences from prior work that examines audit fee
discounting are potentially subject to measurement bias because interim audit procedures are often performed by both
the predecessor and successor auditors but only the successor’s fee needs to be disclosed.
37
Inferences are unchanged if I include Expertt, Mismatcht, and Tenuret as additional explanatory variables in this
estimation. The results also hold if I include MSA fixed effects to account for any time-invariant differences in audit
pricing across markets.
38
Switch is defined as an indicator variable equal to one if the company switches auditors, and zero otherwise (i.e.,
Switch = 1 if TargetSwitch = 1 or OtherSwitch = 1).
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The results of these univariate comparisons are reported in Table 11. As shown, companies
that make a targeted auditor switch on average pay a considerable abnormal audit fee premium
(12.3 percent) in the initial year after the switch.39 In contrast, companies that do not switch
auditors have an average abnormal audit fee that is close to zero (0.5 percent), and companies that
make a non-targeted auditor switch on average receive a substantial fee discount (12.2 percent).
Two-sided t-tests of the differences across these groups are reported in the right-side columns of
Table 11. As shown, each of these across-group differences is statistically significant. In summary,
these results suggest that companies that make targeted auditor switches pay a significant audit fee
premium relative to each comparison group, consistent with the value of targeted auditors’
knowledge being impounded into audit price.
5.2.2 Targeted Auditor Switches and Auditor Quality
While the results of the audit pricing analysis are consistent with clients paying a premium
to account for the value of auditors’ informational capital, a plausible alternative explanation is
that targeted auditor switches and the corresponding audit fee premium are attributable to
companies’ desire for higher auditor quality. In other words, it is possible that companies that
make targeted switches systematically select and pay a premium for higher-quality auditors. To
address this alternative explanation, I examine the preceding average audit quality provided by
targeted auditors, relative to all other auditors in the sample, auditors engaged by companies that
do not switch auditors, and auditors engaged by companies that make non-targeted switches. I use
an audit office’s prior-period misstatement rate—the number of clients in the office with a
misstatement in year t-1 divided by the total number of clients in the same audit office in year t-1
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For comparison, Moon, Shipman, Swanquist, and Whited (2019) estimate auditor-specific abnormal fee premiums
and document that the average Big 4 premium ranges from approximately 23 percent (PwC) to 17 percent (KPMG).
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(AuditorMistRatet)—to proxy for auditor quality.40 The results of univariate comparisons of
AuditorMistRatet across the three comparison groups are presented in Panel A of Table 12. As
shown, targeted auditors (TargetSwitcht = 1) are lower-quality auditors on average relative to all
other auditors in the sample (TargetSwitcht = 0), auditors engaged by companies that do not switch
auditors (Switcht = 0), and auditors engaged by companies making non-targeted switches
(OtherSwitcht = 1), evidenced by a significantly higher average prior-period misstatement rate.
These results do not support the alternative explanation that targeted auditor switches are
associated with the desire for higher auditor quality.
To ensure that the differences in auditor quality across these groups are not attributable to
other observable client and/or auditor characteristics, I also perform a multiple regression analysis.
Specifically, I regress AuditorMistRatet on TargetSwitcht, OtherSwitcht, and the same set of control
variables from Equation (1).41 The results of this estimation are presented in Panel B of Table 12.42
Consistent with the evidence from Panel A, the coefficient on TargetSwitcht is positive and
significant (p < 0.05) and is significantly greater than the coefficient on OtherSwitcht, suggesting
that companies making targeted switches on average subsequently select auditors with higher
preceding rates of audit failure relative to both companies that do not switch auditors and
companies that make non-targeted switches. Also of note, companies that make non-targeted
switches appear to subsequently select higher-quality auditors on average relative to auditors in
continuing engagements (negative coefficient on OtherSwitcht), providing some evidence that
non-targeted switches are associated with improvements in auditor quality.
In the tabulated analyses I use all misstatements (i.e., both “Big R” and “Little r” misstatements) to calculate
AuditorMistRate. However, in untabulated analyses I use only “Big R” misstatements and find similar results for all
tests reported in Table 12.
41
Similar to the audit pricing analysis, inferences are unchanged if I include Expertt, Mismatcht, and Tenuret as
additional explanatory variables in this estimation, and the results hold with the inclusion of MSA fixed effects.
42
The sample for this estimation is slightly smaller than the primary sample due to the loss of 426 observations with
insufficient data necessary to calculate AuditorMistRatet.
40
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5.3 Robustness Tests
5.3.1 Decile Ranks of Changes in Operating Performance
To ensure that the results of the primary estimations of Equation (1) are not a function of
the distributional properties of the dependent variables (i.e., to ensure that the results hold across
the distribution of each variable), I re-estimate both specifications of Equation (1) after decileranking each dependent variable. Specifically, I decile-rank changes in operating income and
changes in operating cash flows to create two new variables (ΔOpIncRankt+2,t and ΔOpCFRankt+2,t)
that are scaled such that the highest (lowest) decile is equal to one (zero). The results of the tests
using these decile-ranked dependent variables are presented in Table 13. Consistent with the
primary results, the coefficient on TargetSwitcht is positive and significant and is significantly
greater than the coefficient on OtherSwitcht in each estimation.
5.3.2 Inclusion of MSA Fixed Effects
Next, to ensure that the results of the primary estimations of Equation (1) are not
attributable to certain time-invariant characteristics of the local markets with targeted switches, I
re-estimate each of the specifications of Equation (1) after including MSA fixed effects. The results
of these tests are presented in Table 14. As shown, the coefficient on TargetSwitcht is positive and
significant and is significantly greater than the coefficient on OtherSwitcht in each estimation.
These results are consistent with the primary results and provide comfort that time-invariant local
market characteristics do not explain the relation between targeted switches and changes in
operating performance.43
5.3.3 OLS Regression
I use robust regression as the primary method to estimate Equation (1), consistent with the
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The results are also robust to the inclusion of MSA-year fixed effects, providing comfort that time-variant
characteristics of local markets do not explain the results.
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recommendations from prior research for samples that involve a small number of treatment
observations (Ryan et al. 2016; Kelly et al. 2017; Leone et al. 2019). However, for robustness, I
re-estimate both specifications of Equation (1) using OLS regression. The results of these tests are
presented in Table 15. Consistent with the primary results, the coefficient on TargetSwitcht is
positive and significant and is significantly greater than the coefficient on OtherSwitcht in each
estimation. These results provide additional comfort that my primary inferences are not contingent
on a single research design decision.
5.3.4 Kernel Density Plots and Tests for Equality of Distribution Functions
As a final robustness test, I compare the distributions of changes in operating performance
for treatment observations (i.e., targeted switches) to the distributions for each of the two main
comparison groups (i.e., non-switches and other switches). More specifically, I plot the kernel
density for both changes in operating income and changes in operating cash flows for each of the
three groups in order to visually compare the distributions. I then statistically test whether these
distributions are different from one another using the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a non-parametric test of whether two independent samples are from
populations with the same distribution (Busse and Green 2002). This test is one of the most
preferred non-parametric techniques because it does not depend on the underlying population
distributions and because it is reliable for small sample sizes (Chakravarti, Laha, and Roy 1967).
The kernel density plots described above are presented in Figure 1. The plots comparing
targeted switches and non-switches are reported in Panel A, and the plots comparing targeted
switches and other switches are reported in Panel B. These plots provide visual evidence
suggesting that the distributions of changes in operating performance for the targeted switch
observations are different from those of the comparison groups (i.e., the targeted switches appear
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to have a right-shifted distribution indicating higher changes in operating performance).
Untabulated two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests confirm that these distributions are
statistically different in each of the four cases (Panel A: p-value < 0.001 for changes in operating
income and p-value = 0.002 for changes in operating cash flows; Panel B: p-value = 0.001 for
changes in operating income and p-value = 0.028 for changes in operating cash flows).
6. Conclusion
Despite auditors’ codified obligation to protect sensitive client information, there is extant
evidence suggesting that companies are reluctant to share an auditor with a competitor company
over concerns of proprietary information spillovers (Tierney 1989; Berton and Niebuhr 1990;
Aobdia 2015; Bills et al. 2020; Kang et al. 2020). In this study, I attempt to provide evidence as to
whether companies’ concerns over auditor information spillovers are justified. To do so, I examine
whether companies realize operational benefits from making “targeted auditor switches” (i.e.,
engaging a new auditor recently dismissed by a competitor company). I find that companies that
make these types of switches realize greater subsequent improvements in operating performance
relative to both companies that do not switch auditors and companies that make non-targeted
switches, and I document that the association between targeted auditor switches and improvements
in operating performance varies predictably with several across- and within-market factors. In
addition, I find that the operational improvements associated with targeted switches are driven by
reductions in operating expenditures as opposed to increases in revenues.
This study provides evidence suggesting that proprietary information is transferred (either
intentionally or unintentionally) across companies via external auditors and that auditor
information spillovers are associated with significant operational benefits for the companies to
which the information is likely being transferred. Furthermore, the collective evidence suggests
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that the value of an audit (auditor) is associated with the auditor’s informational capital and extends
beyond that which is traditionally considered by investors and other capital market participants
(Healy and Palepu 2001; DeFond and Zhang 2014). Given that auditors accumulate more
information about their clients than arguably any other external party (KPMG 2014), my findings
should be of interest to wide range of stakeholders, including managers, board members, investors,
and regulators. Finally, although I do not examine concurrent auditor sharing between competitor
companies, the results of my study suggest that companies’ concerns over auditor sharing are likely
based on real information spillover costs and that these costs are potentially relevant to the auditor
selection process.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: AICPA Code of Professional Conduct Rule 301
.01 Rule 301—Confidential client information. A member in public practice shall not
disclose any confidential client information without the specific consent of the client.
This rule shall not be construed (1) to relieve a member of his or her professional
obligations under rules 202 [ET section 202.01] and 203 [ET section 203.01], (2) to affect in any
way the member's obligation to comply with a validly issued and enforceable subpoena or
summons, or to prohibit a member's compliance with applicable laws and government
regulations, (3) to prohibit review of a member's professional practice under AICPA or state
CPA society or Board of Accountancy authorization, or (4) to preclude a member from initiating
a complaint with, or responding to any inquiry made by, the professional ethics division or trial
board of the Institute or a duly constituted investigative or disciplinary body of a state CPA
society or Board of Accountancy.
Members of any of the bodies identified in (4) above and members involved with
professional practice reviews identified in (3) above shall not use to their own advantage or
disclose any member's confidential client information that comes to their attention in carrying
out those activities. This prohibition shall not restrict members' exchange of information in
connection with the investigative or disciplinary proceedings described in (4) above or the
professional practice reviews described in (3) above. [As amended January 14, 1992.]
Interpretations under Rule 301—Confidential Client Information
[.02] [301-1]—[Deleted]
[.03] [301-2]—[Deleted]
.04 301-3—Confidential information and the purchase, sale, or merger of a practice.
Rule 301 [ET section 301.01] prohibits a member in public practice from disclosing any
confidential client information without the specific consent of the client. The rule provides that it
shall not be construed to prohibit the review of a member's professional practice under AICPA or
state CPA society authorization.
For purposes of rule 301 [ET section 301.01], a review of a member's professional practice is
hereby authorized to include a review in conjunction with a prospective purchase, sale, or merger
of all or part of a member's practice. The member must take appropriate precautions (for
example, through a written confidentiality agreement) so that the prospective purchaser does not
disclose any information obtained in the course of the review, since such information is deemed
to be confidential client information.
Members reviewing a practice in connection with a prospective purchase or merger shall not use
to their advantage nor disclose any member's confidential client information that comes to their
attention. [Effective February 28, 1990.]
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions
Variable

Definition

ΔOpCF

Two-year change in the company’s operating cash flows
scaled by average total assets.

ΔOpCFRank

Decile rank of ΔOpCF, scaled such that the highest (lowest)
decile equals one (zero).

ΔOpInc

Two-year change in the company’s operating income, scaled
by average total assets.

ΔOpIncRank

Decile rank of ΔOpInc, scaled such that the highest (lowest)
decile equals one (zero).

AbnFee

The residual from the regression estimation of the natural
logarithm of audit fees paid to the company’s auditor on the
same set of control variables from Equation (1).

Age

The difference between the current fiscal year and the first
fiscal year in which the company appears in Compustat.

AuditorMistRate

For a given audit office, defined as the number of clients with
a misstatement in the preceding period, divided by the total
number of clients in the same period.

Cash

Cash divided by total assets.

CEOChange

An indicator variable equal to one if the company changes
CEOs, and zero otherwise.

DecreaseOpExp

An indicator variable equal to one if the two-year percentage
change in the company’s ratio of operating expenses to
revenues is below the median change for the full sample, and
zero otherwise.

DiscAcc

The absolute value of discretionary accruals, calculated
according to the Modified Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan, and
Sweeney 1995).

Enforce

An indicator variable equal to one if the audit engagement
occurs in a state-year in the top half of Bishara’s (2011) stateby-state index of non-compete agreement enforceability, and
zero otherwise.

Expert

An indicator variable equal to one if the ratio of the auditor’s
number of clients in the industry to the auditor’s total number
of clients is greater than the median ratio for all auditors in the
sample, and zero otherwise.

GoingConcern

An indicator variable equal to one if the company receives a
going concern audit opinion, and zero otherwise.
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Growth

The year-over-year percentage change in the company’s total
assets.

HighLiab

An indicator variable equal to one if the audit engagement
occurs in a state-year with full joint-and-several liability, and
zero otherwise (Gaver, Paterson, and Pacini 2012;
Anantharaman, Pittman, and Wans 2016).

IncreaseRevt

An indicator variable equal to one if the two-year percentage
change in the company’s revenues is above the median change
for the full sample, and zero otherwise.

IndConc

Calculated by industry-year as the sum of the squares of
market share (based on total revenues) for each company in a
two-digit SIC industry.

InvIntens

The ratio of the company’s total inventories (including the
LIFO reserve) to total assets.

InvRec

The sum of inventory and receivables divided by total assets.

Leverage

Total debt divided by total assets.

Loss

An indicator variable equal to one if return on assets is less
than zero, and zero otherwise.

M&A

An indicator variable equal to one if the company reports
merger and/or acquisition activity, and zero otherwise.

MarketSwitch

An indicator variable equal to one if a local market competitor
company switches auditors, and zero otherwise.

Mismatch

An indicator variable equal to one for mismatched auditorclient engagements defined following Shu (2000), and zero
otherwise.

ModOpinion

An indicator variable equal to one if the company’s audit
opinion is modified for anything other than a going concern,
and zero otherwise.

OtherSwitch

An indicator variable equal to one if the company switches
auditors and does not make a targeted switch (i.e.,
TargetSwitch = 0), and zero otherwise.

ROA

Return on assets, defined as net income before extraordinary
items divided by average total assets.
The natural logarithm of the company’s total assets.

Size
Switch

An indicator variable equal to one if the company switches
auditors, and zero otherwise.

44

TargetSwitch

An indicator variable equal to one if the company switches
auditors and the incoming auditor was dismissed by (or
resigned from) one of the company’s local market competitors
in the preceding period, and zero otherwise.

Tenure

The number of years audited by the incumbent auditor.
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Table 1: Sample Selection
Observations

Observations at the intersection of Compustat and Audit Analytics for fiscal years 2002
through 2016

94,781

Less:
Observations without necessary data to construct test variables

(39,285)

Observations without necessary data to construct control variables

(18,771)

Observations in MSA-industries with less than three auditor-client pairs

(9,081)

Total observations meeting full sample criteria

27,644

This table outlines the selection process for the sample.
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

p(25)

Median

p(75)

TargetSwitcht

27,644

0.005

0.074

0.000

0.000

0.000

OtherSwitcht

27,644

0.075

0.263

0.000

0.000

0.000

ΔOpInct+2,t

27,644

-0.009

0.225

-0.049

-0.001

0.041

ΔOpCFt+2.t

27,644

-0.007

0.190

-0.054

-0.002

0.047

Aget

27,644

20.260

15.623

8.000

15.000

27.000

Casht

27,644

0.244

0.248

0.046

0.154

0.374

CEOChanget

27,644

0.103

0.305

0.000

0.000

0.000

DiscAcct

27,644

0.147

0.313

0.021

0.052

0.125

GoingConcernt

27,644

0.046

0.208

0.000

0.000

0.000

Growtht

27,644

0.138

0.516

-0.051

0.048

0.177

InvRect

27,644

0.233

0.183

0.082

0.194

0.341

Leveraget

27,644

0.214

0.286

0.003

0.151

0.326

Losst

27,644

0.378

0.485

0.000

0.000

1.000

M&At

27,644

0.482

0.500

0.000

0.000

1.000

ModOpiniont

27,644

0.368

0.482

0.000

0.000

1.000

ROAt

27,644

-0.059

0.331

-0.078

0.028

0.076

Sizet

27,644

5.894

2.191

4.175

5.781

7.467

This table presents descriptive statistics for the variables in Equation (1). All variables are formally defined in
Appendix B.
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Table 3: Correlations
Variable
(1) TargetSwitch t
(2) OtherSwitch t

(1)
1.00

(2)

(3)

-0.02

1.00

(3) ΔOpInc t+2,t

0.01

-0.01

(4) ΔOpCF t+2,t

0.01

-0.01 0.69

(5) Age t
(6) Cash t
(7) CEOChange t
(8) DiscAcc t
(9) GoingConcern t

-0.02 -0.04
0.01
-0.01

(4)

(5)

(8)

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.01 0.02

0.01 -0.09

0.00 0.06

0.11

0.08 -0.02

-0.01 0.04

(12) Leverage t

-0.01

0.02

0.20

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

1.00

0.21 -0.06

1.00

0.02

0.06

0.10 -0.33 -0.01 -0.06 -0.03 -0.09

0.01 0.09

0.10

0.04 -0.28
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(13) Loss t

0.00 0.07

0.10

0.06 -0.27

(14) M&A t

0.00 -0.03

0.02

0.02

(15) ModOpinion t

0.00 0.01

0.02

0.01

(16) ROA t

0.00 -0.06 -0.17 -0.12
-0.01 -0.13

(12)

1.00

0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10

(11) InvRec t

(11)

1.00
1.00

0.01 0.07

(10)

1.00

0.02

0.01

(9)

1.00

0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.09

(10) Growth t

(17) Size t

(7)

1.00

-0.01 -0.04 -0.08 -0.28
0.00

(6)

0.02

0.02

0.28

0.02

0.04

0.19 -0.04 -0.08

1.00

0.08

0.14

0.24 -0.07 -0.13

0.08

0.07 -0.25 -0.01 -0.10 -0.11
0.01 -0.09

1.00

0.00 -0.05

0.07

0.02

0.26 -0.05 -0.03

0.19 -0.29 -0.08 -0.22 -0.36

0.03

0.41 -0.35

0.02 -0.17

-0.01 -0.16 -0.24

1.00

0.03 -0.17
0.10

0.03

0.16 -0.17 -0.54
0.15 -0.39

1.00
0.07

1.00

0.16 -0.06
0.34

0.10

1.00
0.34

1.00

This table presents Pearson’s pairwise correlation coefficients for the full sample of observations (N = 27,644). Coefficients in bold and italics
indicate significance at the ten percent level. All variables are formally defined in Appendix B.

Table 4: Targeted Auditor Switches and Changes in Operating Performance
(1)
ΔOpInct+2,t

(2)
ΔOpCFt+2,t

0.0174***
(2.844)
0.0009
(0.531)
0.0002***
(5.689)
-0.0191***
(-7.092)
-0.0027*
(-1.821)
-0.0006
(-0.345)
0.0039
(1.554)
-0.0077***
(-8.345)
0.0014
(0.394)
-0.0034*
(-1.889)
0.0091***
(7.735)
0.0013
(1.258)
0.0013
(1.110)
-0.1806***
(-100.595)
0.0022***
(7.258)

0.0162***
(2.338)
-0.0001
(-0.057)
0.0000
(0.552)
-0.0322***
(-10.563)
-0.0011
(-0.659)
0.0007
(0.375)
-0.0112***
(-3.872)
-0.0018*
(-1.699)
0.0321***
(7.854)
0.0034*
(1.662)
0.0086***
(6.414)
0.0012
(1.002)
0.0019
(1.484)
-0.1027***
(-50.442)
0.0020***
(5.948)

Yes

Yes

TargetSwitcht > OtherSwitcht

6.83***

5.23**

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

27,644
0.392

27,644
0.132

(+ / -)
TargetSwitcht

+

OtherSwitcht

?

Aget
Casht
CEOChanget
DiscAcct
GoingConcernt
Growtht
InvRect
Leveraget
Losst
M&At
ModOpiniont
ROAt
Sizet

Industry FE / Year FE

This table presents the results of robust regression estimations of Equation (1). The
dependent variable in Column (1) is ΔOpInct+2,t, and the dependent variable in
Column (2) is ΔOpCFt+2,t. All variables are formally defined in Appendix B.
Industry and year specific coefficients are not included for brevity, and t-statistics
are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (one-sided tests of
significance for variables with a predicted direction and two-sided tests otherwise).
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Table 5: Industry Concentration Cross-Sectional Analysis
(+ / -)
TargetSwitcht
TargetSwitcht * IndConct

+

IndConct
OtherSwitcht
Aget
Casht
CEOChanget
DiscAcct
GoingConcernt
Growtht
InvRect
Leveraget
Losst
M&At
ModOpiniont
ROAt
Sizet

Industry FE / Year FE
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(1)
ΔOpInct+2,t

(2)
ΔOpCFt+2,t

-0.0056
(-0.498)
0.3502**
(2.244)
0.1199***
(4.559)
0.0009
(0.524)
0.0002***
(5.706)
-0.0189***
(-7.036)
-0.0027*
(-1.798)
-0.0008
(-0.485)
0.0042*
(1.670)
-0.0076***
(-8.318)
0.0013
(0.366)
-0.0034*
(-1.911)
0.0092***
(7.828)
0.0012
(1.163)
0.0012
(1.071)
-0.1808***
(-100.779)
0.0022***
(7.354)

-0.0101
(-0.799)
0.4427***
(2.502)
0.1303***
(4.371)
-0.0002
(-0.098)
0.0000
(0.538)
-0.0321***
(-10.526)
-0.0011
(-0.658)
0.0004
(0.207)
-0.0110***
(-3.808)
-0.0018*
(-1.742)
0.0320***
(7.842)
0.0036*
(1.755)
0.0087***
(6.509)
0.0010
(0.871)
0.0020
(1.490)
-0.1031***
(-50.683)
0.0021***
(6.030)

Yes

Yes

27,644
0.393

27,644
0.134

This table presents the results of robust regression estimations of a modified form
of Equation (1), with the inclusion of IndConct and the interaction of TargetSwitcht
and IndConct as additional explanatory variables. The dependent variable in Column
(1) is ΔOpInct+2,t, and the dependent variable in Column (2) is ΔOpCFt+2,t. All
variables are formally defined in Appendix B. Industry and year specific coefficients
are not included for brevity, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the
coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively (one-sided tests of significance for variables with a predicted
direction and two-sided tests otherwise).
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Table 6: Enforceability of Non-Compete Agreements Cross-Sectional Analysis
(+ / -)
TargetSwitcht
TargetSwitcht * Enforcet

+

Enforcet
OtherSwitcht
Aget
Casht
CEOChanget
DiscAcct
GoingConcernt
Growtht
InvRect
Leveraget
Losst
M&At
ModOpiniont
ROAt
Sizet

Industry FE / Year FE
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(1)
ΔOpInct+2,t

(2)
ΔOpCFt+2,t

0.0063
(0.765)
0.0236**
(1.929)
0.0025***
(2.653)
0.0009
(0.517)
0.0002***
(5.629)
-0.0185***
(-6.861)
-0.0028*
(-1.842)
-0.0006
(-0.370)
0.0040
(1.565)
-0.0076***
(-8.308)
0.0015
(0.414)
-0.0035**
(-1.964)
0.0092***
(7.792)
0.0013
(1.241)
0.0013
(1.126)
-0.1806***
(-100.665)
0.0022***
(7.381)

0.0051
(0.540)
0.0264**
(1.901)
0.0007
(0.616)
-0.0001
(-0.049)
0.0000
(0.541)
-0.0319***
(-10.447)
-0.0011
(-0.668)
0.0007
(0.349)
-0.0110***
(-3.838)
-0.0018*
(-1.680)
0.0321***
(7.873)
0.0034*
(1.681)
0.0086***
(6.444)
0.0012
(0.996)
0.0020
(1.505)
-0.1026***
(-50.428)
0.0020***
(5.985)

Yes

Yes

27,644
0.393

27,644
0.133

This table presents the results of robust regression estimations of a modified form
of Equation (1), with the inclusion of Enforcet and the interaction of TargetSwitcht
and Enforcet as additional explanatory variables. The dependent variable in Column
(1) is ΔOpInct+2,t, and the dependent variable in Column (2) is ΔOpCFt+2,t. All
variables are formally defined in Appendix B. Industry and year specific coefficients
are not included for brevity, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the
coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively (one-sided tests of significance for variables with a predicted
direction and two-sided tests otherwise).
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Table 7: Auditor Liability Exposure Cross-Sectional Analysis
(+ / -)
TargetSwitcht
TargetSwitcht * HighLiabt

-

HighLiabt
OtherSwitcht
Aget
Casht
CEOChanget
DiscAcct
GoingConcernt
Growtht
InvRect
Leveraget
Losst
M&At
ModOpiniont
ROAt
Sizet

Industry FE / Year FE
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(1)
ΔOpInct+2,t

(2)
ΔOpCFt+2,t

0.0287***
(2.846)
-0.0358***
(-2.502)
-0.0022*
(-1.663)
0.0013
(0.591)
0.0002***
(3.599)
-0.0143***
(-3.800)
-0.0023
(-1.014)
-0.0021
(-0.619)
0.0040
(1.182)
-0.0078***
(-5.999)
0.0101**
(2.044)
-0.0028
(-1.122)
0.0120***
(7.399)
0.0000
(0.020)
0.0015
(1.030)
-0.1839***
(-73.766)
0.0026***
(6.000)

0.0198*
(1.756)
-0.0232*
(-1.452)
0.0023
(1.564)
-0.0024
(-0.982)
0.0000
(0.061)
-0.0268***
(-6.366)
-0.0007
(-0.273)
0.0124***
(3.240)
-0.0133***
(-3.476)
-0.0033**
(-2.264)
0.0275***
(4.969)
0.0035
(1.225)
0.0097***
(5.365)
-0.0009
(-0.542)
0.0023
(1.436)
-0.1220***
(-43.790)
0.0022***
(4.534)

Yes

Yes

16,760
0.369

16,760
0.162

This table presents the results of robust regression estimations of a modified form
of Equation (1), with the inclusion of HighLiabt and the interaction of TargetSwitcht
and HighLiabt as additional explanatory variables. The dependent variable in
Column (1) is ΔOpInct+2,t, and the dependent variable in Column (2) is ΔOpCFt+2,t.
All variables are formally defined in Appendix B. Industry and year specific
coefficients are not included for brevity, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses
below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05,
and 0.01 levels, respectively (one-sided tests of significance for variables with a
predicted direction and two-sided tests otherwise).

52

Table 8: Inventory Intensity Cross-Sectional Analysis
(+ / -)
TargetSwitcht
TargetSwitcht * InvIntenst

+

InvIntenst
OtherSwitcht
Aget
Casht
CEOChanget
DiscAcct
GoingConcernt
Growtht
InvRect
Leveraget
Losst
M&At
ModOpiniont
ROAt
Sizet

Industry FE / Year FE
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

(1)
ΔOpInct+2,t

(2)
ΔOpCFt+2,t

0.0103
(1.434)
0.0892**
(1.760)
0.0134**
(1.989)
0.0009
(0.534)
0.0002***
(5.612)
-0.0189***
(-7.000)
-0.0026*
(-1.766)
-0.0006
(-0.373)
0.0040
(1.558)
-0.0078***
(-8.426)
-0.0047
(-1.016)
-0.0036**
(-2.010)
0.0091***
(7.690)
0.0014
(1.383)
0.0013
(1.147)
-0.1810***
(-100.852)
0.0022***
(7.346)

0.0055
(0.680)
0.1535***
(2.673)
-0.0851***
(-11.150)
0.0002
(0.083)
0.0000
(0.933)
-0.0335***
(-10.982)
-0.0016
(-0.920)
0.0010
(0.496)
-0.0109***
(-3.798)
-0.0011
(-1.023)
0.0691***
(13.292)
0.0034*
(1.661)
0.0089***
(6.647)
0.0005
(0.465)
0.0017
(1.306)
-0.1024***
(-50.313)
0.0019***
(5.624)

Yes

Yes

27,644
0.393

27,644
0.137

This table presents the results of robust regression estimations of a modified form
of Equation (1), with the inclusion of InvIntenst and the interaction of TargetSwitcht
and InvIntenst as additional explanatory variables. The dependent variable in
Column (1) is ΔOpInct+2,t, and the dependent variable in Column (2) is ΔOpCFt+2,t.
All variables are formally defined in Appendix B. Industry and year specific
coefficients are not included for brevity, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses
below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05,
and 0.01 levels, respectively (one-sided tests of significance for variables with a
predicted direction and two-sided tests otherwise).
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Table 9: Targeted Auditor Switches and Source of Operating Performance Improvements
(+ / -)
TargetSwitcht

+

OtherSwitcht

?

(1)
DecreaseOpExpt+2,t
0.0963**
(2.183)
0.0205
(1.631)
0.0010***
(4.182)
-0.0496**
(-2.523)
0.0139
(1.288)
0.0003
(0.024)
-0.0171
(-0.913)
-0.0081
(-1.188)
0.0021
(0.080)
-0.0003
(-0.020)
0.2038***
(24.062)
-0.0030
(-0.409)
-0.0021
(-0.253)
-0.1183***
(-8.941)
0.0174***
(8.081)

Aget
Casht
CEOChanget
DiscAcct
GoingConcernt
Growtht
InvRect
Leveraget
Losst
M&At
ModOpiniont
ROAt
Sizet

Industry FE / Year FE

Yes

TargetSwitcht > OtherSwitcht
TargetSwitcht – OtherSwitcht = 0

2.78**

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

27,097
0.054

(+ / -)
?
?

(2)
IncreaseRevtt+2,t
-0.0010
(-0.023)
-0.0301**
(-2.493)
-0.0035***
(-14.987)
0.0775***
(4.112)
-0.0716***
(-6.909)
-0.0021
(-0.173)
-0.0955***
(-5.322)
0.1409***
(21.405)
-0.1512***
(-6.105)
-0.0227*
(-1.832)
-0.0822***
(-10.109)
0.0577***
(8.117)
-0.0085
(-1.066)
-0.0352***
(-2.774)
-0.0015
(-0.732)
Yes

0.45
27,100
0.120

This table presents the results of robust regression estimations of a modified form of Equation (1),
with DecreaseOpExpt+2,t included as the dependent variable in Column (1) and IncreaseRevtt+2,t
included as the dependent variable in Column (2). All variables are formally defined in Appendix
B. Industry and year specific coefficients are not included for brevity, and t-statistics are presented
in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05,
and 0.01 levels, respectively (one-sided tests of significance for variables with a predicted direction
and two-sided tests otherwise).
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Table 10: Test of Auditor-Client Realignments

(+ / -)
MarketSwitcht-1
Aget-1
Casht-1
CEOChanget-1
DiscAcct-1
GoingConcernt-1
Growtht-1
InvRect-1
Leveraget-1
Losst-1
M&At-1
ModOpiniont-1
ROAt-1
Sizet-1
Expertt-1
Mismatcht-1
Tenuret-1

+

(1)
Switch to Local
Market Auditort

(+ / -)

0.3015***
(4.009)
0.0010
(0.368)
-0.2866
(-1.624)
0.0072
(0.062)
-0.0140
(-0.133)
0.2666*
(1.833)
0.0525
(1.242)
0.2313
(0.981)
-0.1825
(-1.432)
0.2471***
(3.301)
0.0167
(0.238)
0.2380***
(3.089)
-0.1439*
(-1.880)
-0.0935***
(-4.335)
-0.2240***
(-3.344)
0.2247***
(2.791)
0.0319**
(2.192)

Industry FE / Year FE

?

(2)
Switch to Non-Local
Market Auditort
-0.2334***
(-3.159)
0.0036
(1.306)
-0.7899***
(-4.237)
0.2622**
(2.341)
0.1267
(1.181)
0.5670***
(4.161)
0.0853**
(2.057)
0.1264
(0.581)
0.0497
(0.474)
0.1909**
(2.375)
0.0926
(1.234)
0.0885
(1.030)
0.2038**
(1.962)
-0.4158***
(-16.963)
0.0610
(0.846)
0.1358*
(1.685)
-0.0413***
(-2.758)

Yes

Observations
Pseudo R-squared

27,644
0.100

This table presents the results of a multinomial logistic regression estimation with companies that
do not switch auditors in period t serving as the reference group. Column (1) reports the results for
switches to a local market auditor in period t, and Column (2) reports the results for switches to a
non-local market auditor in period t. All variables are formally defined in Appendix B. Industry and
year specific coefficients are not included for brevity, and z-statistics are presented in parentheses
below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels,
respectively (one-sided tests of significance for variables with a predicted direction and two-sided
tests otherwise).

55

Table 11: Targeted Auditor Switches and Audit Pricing

Variable

TargetSwitcht = 1
N
Mean

AbnFeet

151

Variable

TargetSwitcht = 1
N
Mean

AbnFeet

151

Variable

TargetSwitcht = 1
N
Mean

AbnFeet

151

TargetSwitcht = 0
N
Mean

0.123

27,493

-0.004

Switcht = 0
N
Mean

0.123

25,421

0.005

OtherSwitcht = 1
N
Mean

0.123

2,072

-0.122

Difference

t-test

0.127

2.21**

Difference

t-test

0.118

2.04**

Difference

t-test

0.245

4.13***

This table presents the results of comparisons of the mean values of AbnFeet across companies that make targeted
auditor switches (TargetSwitcht = 1) and three comparison groups, including all other companies in the sample
(TargetSwitcht = 0), companies that do not switch auditors (Switcht = 0), and companies that make non-targeted auditor
switches (OtherSwitcht = 1). Two-sided t-tests of the differences across these groups are reported in the right-side
columns of the table. All variables are formally defined in Appendix B.
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Table 12: Targeted Auditor Switches and Auditor Quality
Panel A: Univariate comparisons
TargetSwitcht = 1
Variable
N
Mean
AuditorMistRatet

150

Variable

TargetSwitcht = 1
N
Mean

AuditorMistRatet

150

Variable

TargetSwitcht = 1
N
Mean

AuditorMistRatet

150

TargetSwitcht = 0
N
Mean

0.131

27,068

N

0.131

0.105

Switcht = 0
Mean

25,159

0.105

OtherSwitcht = 1
N
Mean

0.131

1,909

0.104

Difference

t-test

0.026

3.57***

Difference

t-test

0.026

3.56***

Difference

t-test

0.027

3.52***

Panel A of this table presents the results of comparisons of the mean values of AuditorMistRatet across companies that
make targeted auditor switches (TargetSwitcht = 1) and three comparison groups, including all other companies in the
sample (TargetSwitcht = 0), companies that do not switch auditors (Switcht = 0), and companies that make non-targeted
auditor switches (OtherSwitcht = 1). Two-sided t-tests of the differences across these groups are reported in the rightside columns of Panel A. All variables are formally defined in Appendix B. Panel B presents the results of a robust
regression estimation of a modified form of Equation (1), with AuditorMistRatet included as the dependent variable.
Industry and year specific coefficients are not included for brevity, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses below
the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (one-sided
tests of significance for variables with a predicted direction and two-sided tests otherwise).
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Table 12 (Cont.)
Panel B: Multiple regression
(+ / -)
TargetSwitcht

?

OtherSwitcht

?

Aget
Casht
CEOChanget
DiscAcct
GoingConcernt
Growtht
InvRect
Leveraget
Losst
M&At
ModOpiniont
ROAt
Sizet

Industry FE / Year FE

(1)
AuditorMistRatet
0.0126**
(2.035)
-0.0130***
(-7.094)
-0.0003***
(-7.988)
0.0123***
(4.478)
0.0012
(0.820)
0.0018
(1.018)
-0.0085***
(-3.268)
-0.0026***
(-2.739)
0.0044
(1.192)
0.0033*
(1.832)
0.0031**
(2.555)
0.0021**
(2.006)
0.0048***
(4.070)
-0.0019
(-1.027)
0.0060***
(19.490)
Yes

TargetSwitcht – OtherSwitcht = 0
Observations
Adjusted R-squared

15.97***
27,218
0.192
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Table 13: Decile Ranks of Changes in Operating Performance
(1)
ΔOpIncRankt+2,t

(2)
ΔOpCFRankt+2,t

0.0825***
(3.115)
0.0023
(0.309)
0.0007***
(4.669)
-0.1080***
(-9.271)
-0.0055
(-0.856)
-0.0000
(-0.006)
-0.0469***
(-4.267)
-0.0283***
(-7.107)
0.0488***
(3.134)
0.0005
(0.068)
0.1319***
(25.817)
0.0097**
(2.173)
0.0045
(0.904)
-0.2172***
(-27.953)
0.0147***
(11.309)

0.0677***
(2.464)
-0.0059
(-0.754)
-0.0000
(-0.289)
-0.1256***
(-10.400)
-0.0036
(-0.532)
-0.0114
(-1.480)
-0.0450***
(-3.952)
-0.0068
(-1.643)
0.1494***
(9.250)
0.0406***
(5.052)
0.0752***
(14.199)
0.0027
(0.589)
0.0054
(1.045)
-0.1481***
(-18.386)
0.0104***
(7.754)

Yes

Yes

TargetSwitcht > OtherSwitcht

8.63***

6.77***

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

27,644
0.113

27,644
0.047

(+ / -)
TargetSwitcht

+

OtherSwitcht

?

Aget
Casht
CEOChanget
DiscAcct
GoingConcernt
Growtht
InvRect
Leveraget
Losst
M&At
ModOpiniont
ROAt
Sizet

Industry FE / Year FE

This table presents the results of robust regression estimations of a modified form
of Equation (1), with ΔOpIncRankt+2,t included as the dependent variable in Column
(1) and ΔOpCFRankt+2,t included as the dependent variable in Column (2). All
variables are formally defined in Appendix B. Industry and year specific coefficients
are not included for brevity, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the
coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01
levels, respectively (one-sided tests of significance for variables with a predicted
direction and two-sided tests otherwise).
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Table 14: Inclusion of MSA Fixed Effects
(1)
ΔOpInct+2,t

(2)
ΔOpCFt+2,t

0.0184***
(2.999)
0.0012
(0.707)
0.0002***
(5.273)
-0.0190***
(-6.771)
-0.0027*
(-1.833)
-0.0003
(-0.203)
0.0034
(1.343)
-0.0076***
(-8.245)
0.0028
(0.777)
-0.0030*
(-1.666)
0.0087***
(7.346)
0.0009
(0.817)
0.0013
(1.094)
-0.1835***
(-101.931)
0.0023***
(7.278)

0.0168***
(2.415)
0.0002
(0.088)
0.0000
(0.861)
-0.0370***
(-11.634)
-0.0012
(-0.710)
0.0012
(0.630)
-0.0107***
(-3.692)
-0.0014
(-1.378)
0.0339***
(8.247)
0.0037*
(1.836)
0.0080***
(5.935)
0.0007
(0.616)
0.0019
(1.416)
-0.1033***
(-50.639)
0.0018***
(5.167)

Yes

Yes

TargetSwitcht > OtherSwitcht

7.38***

5.38**

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

27,644
0.399

27,644
0.136

(+ / -)
TargetSwitcht

+

OtherSwitcht

?

Aget
Casht
CEOChanget
DiscAcct
GoingConcernt
Growtht
InvRect
Leveraget
Losst
M&At
ModOpiniont
ROAt
Sizet

Industry FE / Year FE / MSA FE

This table presents the results of robust regression estimations of a modified form
of Equation (1), with the inclusion of MSA fixed effects. The dependent variable in
Column (1) is ΔOpInct+2,t, and the dependent variable in Column (2) is ΔOpCFt+2,t.
All variables are formally defined in Appendix B. Industry, year, and MSA specific
coefficients are not included for brevity, and t-statistics are presented in parentheses
below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05,
and 0.01 levels, respectively (one-sided tests of significance for variables with a
predicted direction and two-sided tests otherwise).
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Table 15: OLS Regression
(1)
ΔOpInct+2,t

(2)
ΔOpCFt+2,t

0.0264**
(1.997)
-0.0136**
(-2.064)
0.0001
(1.197)
-0.0412***
(-2.939)
-0.0108*
(-1.892)
-0.0140
(-1.311)
-0.0550***
(-3.238)
-0.0031
(-0.784)
0.0763***
(5.465)
0.0357***
(2.708)
0.0230***
(2.922)
0.0023
(0.813)
-0.0059*
(-1.910)
-0.1534***
(-5.278)
0.0099***
(9.336)

0.0257**
(1.845)
-0.0118**
(-2.284)
-0.0002**
(-2.234)
-0.0523***
(-4.893)
-0.0044
(-1.013)
-0.0206**
(-2.476)
-0.0377***
(-3.011)
-0.0039
(-1.080)
0.0964***
(9.096)
0.0425***
(3.817)
0.0102*
(1.930)
0.0001
(0.041)
-0.0045*
(-1.659)
-0.0993***
(-5.213)
0.0059***
(7.563)

Yes

Yes

TargetSwitcht > OtherSwitcht

7.49***

6.55***

Observations
Adjusted R-squared

27,644
0.059

27,644
0.042

(+ / -)
TargetSwitcht

+

OtherSwitcht

?

Aget
Casht
CEOChanget
DiscAcct
GoingConcernt
Growtht
InvRect
Leveraget
Losst
M&At
ModOpiniont
ROAt
Sizet

Industry FE / Year FE

This table presents the results of OLS regression estimations of Equation (1). The
dependent variable in Column (1) is ΔOpInct+2,t, and the dependent variable in
Column (2) is ΔOpCFt+2,t. All variables are formally defined in Appendix B.
Industry and year specific coefficients are not included for brevity, and t-statistics
are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively (one-sided tests of
significance for variables with a predicted direction and two-sided tests otherwise).
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Figure 1: Kernel Density Plots of Changes in Operating Performance
Panel A: Targeted switches vs. non-switches

Panel A of Figure 1 reports kernel density plots of two-year changes in operating income
and two-year changes in operating cash flows for companies that make targeted auditor
switches (dashed line) and companies that do not switch auditors (solid line).
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Figure 1 (Cont.)
Panel B: Targeted switches vs. other switches

Panel B of Figure 1 reports kernel density plots of two-year changes in operating income
and two-year changes in operating cash flows for companies that make targeted auditor
switches (dashed line) and companies that make non-targeted auditor switches (solid
line).
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